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Abstract
Relational value (RV) has recently been introduced as a third class of values for understanding values of nature and are 
thought to sit alongside more familiar axiological categories such as instrumental and intrinsic value. The concept has quickly 
gained ground in and promises to better capture how people and collectives perceive of their wellbeing and make choices 
that involve the natural world. While the idea of relational value is not without merits, its initial and current conceptualiza-
tion raises questions about how it relates to existing value concepts. Here, we start from an interdisciplinary perspective 
and delineate how the concept can contribute to addressing problems in three fields that deal with environmental values in 
different ways: environmental ethics; ecosystem services valuation; and environmental psychology. We provide an overview 
of value concepts in each field and show how relational value has been described or applied. Our analysis shows that value 
concepts are used to solve different problems in the three fields, and these differences have implications for how relational 
value can be framed and situated in values theory. These differences involve e.g., the descriptive question of how people 
value nature versus the normative questions of why nature should be valued. We show how the concept can be seen as solving 
the problem of narrow conceptualizations of intrinsic and instrumental value in ecosystem services valuation and suggest 
that RV can be conceived of as an epistemological framing rather than a values concept. The concept also has potential to 
function as a ‘boundary object’ to provide cross-fertilization of disciplinary perspectives.
Keywords Relational value · Intrinsic value · Environmental values · Environmental valuation · Socio-cultural valuation · 
Ecosystem services value
Introduction
A wave of “relationality” has recently swept the scholarly 
discussions on ecosystem services (ES) (e.g., Chan et al. 
2016; Arias-Arévalo et al. 2017, 2018; Díaz et al. 2015). 
Proposed as a “third class of values” (Chan et al. 2016, p. 
1462) for understanding values of nature, relational val-
ues (RVs) are intended to sit alongside the axiological 
categories of instrumental and intrinsic value. The concept 
is thought to better capture how people and collectives per-
ceive of their wellbeing and make choices that involve the 
environment; including “preferences, principles, and vir-
tues associated with relationships both interpersonal and 
as articulated by policies and social norms” (Chan et al. 
2016, p. 1462). Proponents of the concept have voiced 
hope that the concept can help overcome long-standing 
intellectual conflicts regarding the value of nature, and 
provide a conceptual basis flexible enough to encompass 
the plurality of values and worldviews necessary for the 
ES framework to do its job (Jax et al. 2013; Himes and 
Muraca 2018). In spite of the rise in popularity of the con-
cept being rather recent, the influence has been significant. 
The International Panel on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES) framework for understanding nature’s 
contributions to people (Díaz et al. 2018; Pascual et al. 
2017) has incorporated the values category and the British 
Ecological Society recently launched their sixth journal 
Theoretical traditions in social values for sustainability
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People and Nature under the slogan “a journal of relational 
thinking”.
In a recent special issue devoted to RV (Pascual et al. 
2018), Chan et al. (2018) explained the development of the 
concept as a strategic aspiration of bridging ideas across 
fields to affect the discourse on values in science-policy 
organizations, as well as relying on a tactical opportunity 
tied to the word ‘values’ in the IPBES conceptual frame-
work. As the authors note, however, this use of RV as a 
value category raises familiar conceptual concerns, and 
they state that “there is a real danger that an ambiguous 
term is popular because everyone sees what they want in 
it, but there is no common ground for collective action or 
insight.” (Chan et al. 2018, p. A2). The development of 
the concept has multiple aims and is considered to address 
multiple interdisciplinary problems related to sustainabil-
ity, but it is unclear to what extent the framing as a values 
concept is appropriate to contribute to these goals.
Recent efforts have provided valuable clarifications on 
the theoretical foundations of RV and how to fit the con-
cept in its historical and philosophical context (Pascual 
et al. 2018). RV has also been compared to other value 
categories such as assigned, held, and moral values (Chan 
et al. 2018), and Himes and Muraca (2018) provided the 
definition of RV as anthropocentric yet non-instrumental. 
However, questions remain as to how the notion of RV 
connects, and informs, entrenched ways of thinking about 
values. Piccolo (2017) pointed out that the conceptualiza-
tion is departing from a too simplistic construal of con-
ventional philosophical distinctions, such as that between 
intrinsic and instrumental values. As RV takes on a life of 
its own in academic and policy contexts, it is important to 
understand its theoretical underpinnings and rationales, in 
particular since different fields may have contrasting views 
of value as a concept (see Kenter et al. 2019; Rawluk et al. 
2019 this issue).
With this paper, we aim to contribute to an understand-
ing of the RV concept as a theoretical construct taking an 
interdisciplinary perspective. The objective is to critically 
examine, where and how the concept can contribute to 
our understanding of values within different disciplinary 
contexts. Starting from the perspective of RV as advocated 
by Chan et al. (2016, 2018) we delineate what ‘job’ the 
concept is described to do through comparing it to existing 
value concepts in three fields that deal with environmental 
values and value concepts in different ways: environmental 
ethics, ecosystem services valuation, and environmental 
psychology. We use three guiding questions to frame our 
analysis of each field: How are value concepts defined 
in the field? How has relational value been described or 
applied with reference to these value concepts? What per-
spectives can relational value add?
Relational value across three fields
The present focus on RV as an explicit concept in the intel-
lectual discourse on ecosystem services is quite recent and 
has risen to prominence only in the past half a decade or 
so (Muraca 2011; Jax et al. 2013; Díaz et al. 2015; Chan 
et al. 2016; Pascual et al. 2017, 2018). Notably, the con-
cept is used in more than one sense in the literature and 
can highlight different points depending on the chosen 
definition. For example, while most accounts align with 
Chan et al. (2016) who refer to social conditions and per-
ceptions, Arias-Arévalo et al. (2017, 2018) describe how 
RV also includes ecological conditions ensuring the pres-
ervation of life on earth. Chan et al. (2018) describe how 
the development of the concept has been mainly motivated 
by interdisciplinary inclusion and real-world application 
and is argued to better capture how people actually think 
of and value nature (Chan et al. 2016).
In Chan et  al. (2016), at least three claims can be 
identified with regards to what constitutes RV, which we 
have aligned with value concepts in three fields. These 
three fields are environmental ethics, ecosystem services 
valuation, and environmental psychology, and they align 
with the three claims in the following manner: (1) RV 
is stated as a third value class next to the ethical value 
categories of intrinsic and instrumental value (see e.g., 
Himes and Muraca 2018); (2) RV is explicitly described 
as a way to overcome challenges in cultural ES valuation; 
and (3) RV is described as a better way of framing how 
people behave and are motivated in relation to the environ-
ment which is, not limited to, but encompassed by envi-
ronmental psychology (Chan et al. 2016). The focus on 
environmental psychology here is not exhaustive of the 
third claim, and we recognize that many other fields and 
disciplines are relevant. Yet, environmental psychology 
employs values concepts with distinct methodologies for 
values constructs (Schultz 2001; Stern and Dietz 1994) 
building on Schwartz theory of basic values (Schwartz 
and Bilsky 1987; Schwartz 2012). This can be contrasted 
to e.g., anthropology and human geography, which use 
a wide variety of mostly qualitative approaches to iden-
tify context-specific value relationships (Ives and Kendall 
2014).
We treat the three perspectives of environmental ethics, 
(cultural) ES valuation, and environmental psychology as 
idealized approaches to value conceptualization and ana-
lyze how RV is contributing to solving problems within 
each field. Importantly, there are diverse ontological and 
epistemological starting points (and associated assump-
tions) for understanding both values and relations within 
a discipline or field and we do not aim to provide an over-
view of all possible ways that these concepts could be 
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interpreted in the three fields. Moreover, the concept of 
relations does not equal RVs and instead of examining 
relations more broadly we wish to incite a deeper theoreti-
cal engagement with RV by providing a brief overview of 
values concepts and categories specifically, as well as a 
few interpretations of RV from within the fields. We will 
now turn to outlining what the concept of value means in 
each of these three fields and related framings of RV.
Value in environmental ethics
Ethics—or sometimes moral philosophy—is a branch of phi-
losophy that can be understood as the “systematic endeavour 
to understand moral concepts and justify moral principles 
and theories” (Pojman 2012, 4). Ethics is divided into three 
main sub-fields; normative ethics, meta-ethics, and finally 
applied ethics, which environmental ethics sorts under. 
Applied ethics is concerned with the morality of specific 
choices such as e.g., abortion, euthanasia, or gene therapy. 
Environmental ethics is the philosophical study of the nor-
mative underpinnings that guide how humans should behave 
towards nature.
Environmental ethics as a field grew out of the environ-
mental crisis of the 1960s and the broader concerns with 
the negative human influence on the natural environment 
and worries about the consequences of unmitigated growth 
voiced in a number of widely influential works e.g., Carson 
(1962), Ehrlich (1968), White (1967), Boulding (1966), Har-
din (1968).1
With respect to value concepts, the operative distinction 
has often been between intrinsic and instrumental values: 
typically understood as that which is valuable as an end in 
itself versus that which is valuable as a means to an end. 
A fundamental question has been whether nature (or some 
part of nature) is to be valued for its own sake, or whether 
it is “merely” instrumentally valuable.2 Here, environmen-
tal ethicists, such as Arne Næss, often reacted against what 
they perceived to be a narrow anthropocentric position and 
sought to replace it with a more permissive ecocentric view, 
lending moral status to various other entities (see Brennan 
and Lo 2016; O’Neill et al. 2008). Næss was an influential 
figure in the 1970s and fathered the Deep Ecology Move-
ment as well as a kind of philosophy of ecological harmony 
he termed Ecosophy. He argued for what he called biospheri-
cal egalitarianism suggesting that all living things are intrin-
sically valuable (see Næss 1973).
However, the intrinsic/instrumental distinction is com-
plex. As O’Neill et al. emphasize (2008, p. 114; see also 
O’Neill 1992; O’Connor and Kenter 2018, this issue) the 
term ‘intrinsic value’ has more than one meaning. Three 
varieties can be distinguished:
1. Intrinsic value as non-instrumental value
2. Intrinsic value as valuable in virtue of its intrinsic prop-
erties
3. Intrinsic value as objective value
The first interpretation is perhaps the most common. Non-
instrumental value is typically understood as pertaining to 
Kantian ends-in-themselves, paradigmatically exemplified 
by other humans to whom we owe moral responsibilities. 
The second version of the concept is often associated with 
Moore (1922) and relates intrinsic value to intrinsic proper-
ties. Intrinsic properties are understood to be non-relational 
properties; i.e., properties that objects have, not in virtue 
of some relation that stand in respect to some other object. 
Precisely what this means is not self-evident but O’Neill 
(1992) offers rarity as a paradigmatic example of a relational 
property. A non-relational property of an object might be 
e.g., it being sentient. The third variety associates intrinsic 
value with objective value; that is value that is independent 
of the evaluative attitudes of some subject. O’Neill further 
distinguishes between a weak and a strong interpretation of 
objectivity. On what O’Neill labels the weak interpretation 
intrinsic value is a property that an object may have even 
in the absence of some valuing subject. The strong inter-
pretation, on the other hand construes objectivity rather in 
terms of whether it is possible to characterize evaluative 
properties “without reference to evaluating agents” (O’Neill 
1992, 126). For instance, sentences such as “moist and well-
drained soil, rich in organic matter are good for rhododen-
drons” seems to make no reference to evaluating agents. 
In what follows we will mainly concern ourselves with the 
weak interpretation.
While commonly conflated and subject to equivocation, 
the three interpretations of intrinsic value are independent. 
For example, consider the meta-ethical distinction between 
objectivism and subjectivism with respect to values. The 
objectivist thinks that intrinsic values exist even in the 
absence of evaluative attitudes of some valuing subject. On 
this take it is natural to interpret intrinsic value according 
to O’Neill’s third construal, which is as objectively exist-
ing. The subjectivist, on the other hand, claims that all val-
ues emanate from the evaluative attitudes of some subject, 
1 Although it is conventional to think of the field as originating dur-
ing this time there were important predecessors. In particular Aldo 
Leopold, and his essay Land Ethic in A Sand Country Almanac (Leo-
pold 1949), but also George Perkins Marsh’s Man and Nature (1864) 
and Alexander von Humboldt’s Views of Nature (von Humboldt 
1850). See Brennan and Lo (2016) and Kawall (2017) for more thor-
ough historical introductions to the environmental ethics.
2 It is common to assume that the distinction between instrumen-
tal and intrinsic value involves a commitment to the idea of the lat-
ter being immeasurably greater than the former (see e.g. Justus et al. 
2009). But to the contrary, it is possible, as Schmidtz (2015) points 
out, to make trade-offs between intrinsic and instrumental values.
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crucially even intrinsic values. In this understanding, X is 
intrinsically valuable if and only if some subject holds X 
to be valuable for its own sake. This is compatible with 
O’Neill’s first construal. An environmental ethicist should 
find it difficult to be objectivist about values and at the same 
time embrace anthropocentrism: the former view would 
involve saying that nature is valuable even in the absence of 
a valuer, whereas the latter position either extends moral sta-
tus only to humans or at least strongly emphasizes humans 
as moral agents.
Relational value and environmental ethics
The term ‘relational value’ is not part of the standard nomen-
clature of environmental ethics. Influential works, such as 
e.g., O’Neill et al. (2008), make no mention of the term, 
and some philosophers have been markedly suspicious of its 
recent rise (see e.g., Maier and Feest 2016; Piccolo 2017). 
That is not to suggest that environmental ethicists are not 
interested in relations or relationships with respect to values. 
Quite to the contrary, the role of relations, not least evalu-
ative relations are prevalent and important in how central 
distinctions can be understood. Before we return to this, let 
us make a couple of observations with respect to the recent 
relational values literature.
A point of terminology. The terms’relation’ and ‘relation-
ships’ are not necessarily synonymous. One suspects that 
the notion of ‘relationship’ already tends to be more imbued 
with values at the outset than ‘relations’. In this paper, how-
ever, we will use these terms interchangeably and commit 
ourselves to nothing more than the most plain understanding 
of what a relation might entail.
One can discern two ideas that appear to be common in 
this literature. First, the notion of RV can be used to say 
something about what is of value. Chan et al. (2016, p. 1462) 
note that “relational values are not present in things but 
derivative of relationships and responsibilities to them.” By 
distinguishing between “the innate relationality of all evalua-
tive process and relational value as the content of valuation”, 
Himes and Muraca (2018, p. 1) describe RV as concerned 
with relations being the objects of value. Chan et al. (2018, 
p. E4) follow their distinction and describe RVs as: “values 
where the relationship itself matters, as more than a means 
to an end (a preference for seeing birds is relational in origin; 
a sense of kinship with birds is relational in content)”. Part 
of this idea is that relations not only hold certain values but 
also that values arise out of these relations.
The second idea targets not the objects of value, but the 
sharp distinction between a valued object and a valuing 
subject. That is to say, a commitment to a sharp human-
nature distinction fundamentally obscures how humans are 
ultimately part of nature. Such ideas have been suggested by 
philosophers, such as Muraca (2011), but can be traced also 
in e.g., Chan et al. (2016), for instance in their assertion that 
some indigenous people tie their identity to the natural envi-
ronment and would find it difficult to think of themselves 
as separate from it in the first place (see Gould et al. 2019; 
Ingold 2006; O’Connor and Kenter 2018).
Returning to environmental ethics, both of these points 
have been important themes in the field. A philosopher 
might point out that Chan et al. (2016) make it easy for 
themselves by committing to a narrow understanding of the 
intrinsic/instrumental distinction. For example, they write 
“Consider a tree or grove deemed sacred, associated with 
collective histories, ancestors, or sustenance of many kinds. 
Is it valuable intrinsically (independent of human valua-
tion) or instrumentally (for preference satisfaction)?” (Chan 
et al. 2016, p. 1463). Here, intrinsic values are thought of as 
objective values, but they are contrasted against preference 
satisfaction. This particular way of construing the intrin-
sic/instrumental distinction is not necessarily exhaustive in 
the relevant domain and if it is the only distinction one has 
to elaborate with then clearly the choice is limiting. Most 
philosophers, however, operate with a very nuanced under-
standing of these concepts, and in particular a more fluid 
way of deploying them that appear not to preclude the points 
that Chan and colleagues are calling for (see Piccolo 2017). 
Another difference, whereas philosophers often construe 
the instrumental/intrinsic distinction such as to exhaust the 
domain—e.g., by defining one concept in the dichotomy as 
the negation of the other (usually in service of some other 
point)—Chan and colleagues make no such commitment. 
A questioning of the human/nature distinction has also long 
been part of environmental ethics. Arne Næss, for example, 
was explicit in arguing for a “relational, total-field image” 
to replace the otherwise prevalent “man-in-environment 
image” (Næss 1973, 95). The point here is not that Chan 
and colleagues are mistaken, but that they use concepts and 
definitions in a different manner.
The most detailed philosophical treatment of RVs is due 
to Muraca (2011) and Himes and Muraca (2018) whose 
work has been a strong influence on proponents of the con-
cepts (Chan et al. 2016; Díaz et al. 2015; Chan et al. 2018). 
Muraca departs, to an extent, from the conventional intrin-
sic/instrumental distinction and contrasts intrinsic values 
(thought of as Kantian as-ends-in-themselves) with rela-
tional and instrumental values. Himes and Muraca (2018) 
argue for the reservation of the term ‘intrinsic values’ to “the 
attribution of inherent moral value to entities that can be 
legitimately considered as subjects-of-a-life or ends in them-
selves in a moral sense” and define RVs as ‘non-instrumental 
anthropocentric’ values (p. 3). An important motivation for 
Himes and Muraca is the narrowness of the intrinsic/instru-
mental distinction, and this focus to a degree simply by-
passes some entrenched problems in environmental ethics 
such as the subjectivist/objectivist dispute.
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The ambition of Chan et  al., however, appear to be 
pragmatic when they suggest that it does not matter that 
the intrinsic/instrumental framework can be expanded to 
include relational values if it cannot be used to communi-
cate with relevant groups and stakeholders. Similarly, Himes 
and Muraca (2018) refer to RVs as a new category of value 
assessment, i.e.: “a new and fruitful category for expressing 
the importance of specific relationships people hold with 
non-human nature” (p. 1). The idea here is that the axio-
logical framework that is needed has to be judged not on its 
philosophical merits alone, but also in how well captures 
and resonates with how relevant agents actually make value-
based decisions. In this sense, Chan et al. depart in their 
aims from those that environmental ethics typically targets. 
Conventionally environmental ethics deals with the norma-
tive question of how and why we should value nature per se. 
The concern with intrinsic values in environmental ethics 
stems from ideas about how we should value nature; e.g., 
nature should be valued as an end in itself and not merely a 
means to end (Kawall 2017). Environmental valuation, on 
the other hand, tries to establish, how, why, and the extent 
to which, some group or community values nature. This 
project is in an important way descriptive in that, although 
there may be normative assumptions behind the valuation 
approach taken, valuation tries to describe values rather than 
answer what values we should have with regard to nature.
Value in ecosystem services valuation
The goal of environmental valuation is to produce scientifi-
cally informed assessments of natural resources to provide 
a rational basis for decision-making (Shmelev 2012). This 
logic and method have received increased attention and 
importance with the international policy agenda that has 
called to value and assess ES at local, regional and national 
levels (MEA 2005; TEEB 2010).
ES valuation is not a comprehensive field but is made up 
of various disciplinary and interdisciplinary research efforts, 
which span the natural and social sciences (in particular eco-
nomics), and aim to assess the value of ES in either quan-
titative or qualitative terms (Maes et al. 2016). Since the 
emergence of the concept, the valuation methods, as well as 
their usefulness for decision-making, have been subject to 
discussion (Costanza et al. 2014; de Groot et al. 2010, 2012; 
Daily et al. 2009; Silvertown 2015). ES valuation encom-
passes methodology from both mainstream environmental 
economics and ecological economics, which draw on dif-
ferent starting points for understanding dynamics between 
biosphere and economy (Venkatachalam 2007). While many 
of the methods that were initially applied and proposed for 
ES valuation had a narrow focus on ecology and econom-
ics (TEEB 2010), the research paradigm has more recently 
broadened to include diverse epistemologies and methodolo-
gies (Braat Leon 2018).
ES valuation can be seen as operating with a tripartite 
typology of values differing between ecological, economic, 
and social value domains. These artificial categories are a 
pragmatic way of allowing for the multiple involved disci-
plines to focus on values in proximity to their respective area 
(Kronenberg and Andersson 2019, this issue). The idea of 
ecological values moves ES valuation beyond strictly eco-
nomic analysis. This notion, that there are ecological values 
pertaining to the life-support system of the ecosystems upon 
which we depend, is a foundational idea in ecological eco-
nomics and a point of departure for the ES concept (Erlich 
and Mooney 1983). Social values have recently received 
more attention, even though the idea is not new in ecologi-
cal economics (Kenter et al. 2015). Social values have been 
defined in a variety of ways (Kenter et al. 2015) but can be 
described as those values that people express regarding the 
environment that are neither strictly ecological nor neces-
sarily captured in meaningful ways by monetary metrics. 
Social values, like many of those values encompassed by ES 
valuation methods, are subjective values in a methodological 
sense, in that they build on social perceptions of environ-
ments (Hejnowicz and Rudd 2017). Typical examples are 
emotional, affective, spiritual and symbolic values (Gómez-
Baggethun and Martín-López 2015). These values were in 
the literature initially associated with cultural ES, but have 
more recently been recognized to be considerably broader 
and not limited to ‘non-material’ benefits, since most ES 
have social and cultural dimensions (Kenter 2016; Scholte 
et al. 2015; Kirchhoff 2012). The valuation methods used 
are varied with regards to disciplinary and methodologi-
cal approaches, with the uniting aim to rank values towards 
ES in non-monetary terms (see Gómez-Baggethun and 
Martín-López, 2015, Table 11.1). Application of sociocul-
tural valuation of ES in Europe has been shown to mainly 
been intended for ‘awareness raising’, i.e. establishing and 
communicating knowledge of values and preferences that 
stakeholders and citizens hold and assign to ES for decision-
making (Walz et al. 2019).
The fundamental concept of value has been defined and 
applied with various different meanings in the ES literature 
(Hejnowicz and Rudd 2017). In the cultural ES literature, 
value is usually taken to mean “evaluative beliefs about the 
worth, importance, or usefulness of something or about 
moral principles” (Hirons et al., 2016, p. 556). While few 
applications of valuation define value concepts more explic-
itly, Kenter et al. (2015) provide a definition of value con-
cepts for ES valuation building on the distinctions between 
transcendental and contextual values as well as value indica-
tors (see “Value in environmental psychology”).
The role of intrinsic values is a point of contention 
within ES valuation. The ES framework builds on an 
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anthropocentric perspective that only considers functions 
of ecosystems that are of use in meeting human needs or 
desires. ES valuation is further seen as encompassing only 
instrumental values. It is unclear to what extent intrin-
sic value can be appropriately captured by ES valuation 
approaches (Scholte et al. 2016; Hirons et al. 2016) and as 
demonstrated by O’Connor and Kenter (2018, this issue) this 
in part depends on what is meant by intrinsic value. Intrinsic 
value is frequently understood as weak objective value, that 
is, as value that an object has even in the absence of some 
valuing subject (see “Value in environmental ethics”), and 
on those terms is excluded from valuation. As we will see 
in the next section, relational value then helps to solve the 
problem of this narrow scope of intrinsic value in ES valu-
ation by broadening what types of values can be included 
in valuation.
Relational value in valuation of ecosystem services
As a trending concept in the ES literature, RV has already 
been adopted in socio-cultural valuation studies. Small et al. 
(2017) describe how the environmental valuation category 
of socio-cultural values can be further divided into three 
value domains: instrumental, intrinsic, and relational value, 
following the value typology outlined by Chan et al. (2016). 
Klain et al. (2017) call for the development of more qualita-
tive approaches since they describe how the qualitative foun-
dations of cultural values which are essential for well-being, 
including connectedness and belonging to a community, are 
not encompassed by quantitative assessments. Other schol-
ars argue that instrumental values, in the form of monetary 
and non-monetary preferences, do not fully capture the ways 
that people assign worth to nature in practice, and overlooks 
significant meanings and ethical questions of human–non-
human relations (Jax et al. 2013; Chan et al. 2012, 2016). 
Consequently, RV is proposed as a third category to get 
around the methodological problem of preference-based 
operationalization of value vis-à-vis intrinsic value as sepa-
rate from humans.
To some extent, RV draws on Brown’s (1984) concep-
tualization of values as related to economic preferences. 
Brown described held values as influencing RVs, which 
are implicit preference judgments sometimes not available 
to elicitation, which in turn influence an expression of a 
preference, i.e. an assigned value (Brown 1984, p. 233). 
An important difference between the ideas is that RVs are 
considered subject to elicitation in e.g., CES valuation, 
as they can be equated with ‘assigned values’ (Chan et al. 
2018). Schroeder (2013, p. 78) also builds on Brown’s 
idea of RV but rejects the linear focus on preferences and 
suggests instead that RVs (or what he refers to as ‘felt 
values’) underlie and are more fundamental than both held 
and assigned values. This description somewhat resonates 
with RVs, even though RV is not necessarily described as 
more fundamental. Felt values are seen as more immedi-
ate, affective and experiential and require a shift from the 
cognitive and analytical view of value to a perspective that 
recognizes the process of making decisions (Schroeder 
2013, p. 77). This idea of context-specific and underlying 
emotional RVs is closely related to the idea of the impor-
tance of meanings of environments, often highlighted by 
the concept’s proponents (i.e. Chan et al. 2016).
The inclusion of meaning through RV seems to be pre-
cisely how the concept is intended to contribute to socio-
cultural valuation. The framing of value in socio-cultural 
valuation has been described as a poor fit with how people 
actually think or behave, which proponents argue is better 
described with the framing of relational value (Chan et al. 
2016). Tadaki et al. (2017) suggest that RV challenges and 
exceeds instrumental and intrinsic value and changes the 
premise for valuation from preferences to including what 
different ecosystems ‘mean’ to people. Using meanings to 
understand the importance (or ‘value’) of people’s rela-
tions with environments for their wellbeing is new to the 
field of environmental valuation, and requires methodolog-
ical changes to be accounted for. To Tadaki et al. (2017), 
the value-as-relations concept emphasizes two things, 
namely: it involves more open-ended conversations about 
how and why environments matter to people, including a 
thoroughly place-based perspective; and it positions eco-
nomic theories of value as merely “one type of relation-
ship among many”. In practice, the applications of the RV 
concept is stated to seek qualitative richness using open-
ended methods such as interviews and discourse analysis, 
drawing on approaches from anthropology, environmental 
sociology, geography, history and cultural studies (ibid.). 
In other words, RV involves an engagement with more 
constructivist epistemologies and perspectives on how 
to conceive of human-nature relations, where meanings 
are seen as contextual and place-based. However, such 
engagement has, to some extent, already been described 
within the ES valuation scholarship, without reference to 
the relational values concept per se. For example, Fish 
et al. (2016) conceptualize cultural ES based on a ‘rela-
tional approach’, which does not suggest new categories 
of value but instead advances the analytical and empiri-
cal categories of ES based on a constructivist approach. 
The special issue on ‘shared, plural and cultural values’ 
(Kenter 2016) also includes various examples of qualita-
tive and humanities-based approaches for understanding 
value. This points to the direction that relational value 
can be seen as a widening of epistemological perspectives 
in ES valuation rather than filling a gap for a new values 
concept. Similar ideas, of value not being constituted by 
preferences and the rejection of methodological individu-
alism, have been formulated in ecological economics and 
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predates the idea of relational values (see Kenter et al. 
2015; Sagoff 1994).
A central argument for RV is its claim to describe how 
people actually think or behave better than the value con-
ceptualizations that are currently dominating environmental 
valuation and policy (Chan et al. 2016). The goal of environ-
mental valuation has been to produce more accurate ways 
of assessing the value of ecosystems. Only recently has this 
come to include the idea of more accurately describing peo-
ple’s inner worlds. How people value, think and behave in 
relation to the natural environment is the focus of environ-
mental psychology, which we shall now turn to.
Value in environmental psychology
Environmental psychology is an interdisciplinary field of 
study concerned with the interrelationships between people 
and their surroundings. Such interrelationships include the 
physical surroundings, both the built and natural environ-
ment, the use of natural resources as and pro-environmental 
behavior. The field can be divided into at least eight major 
theoretical approaches (see Box 1). The descriptive-empir-
ical knowledge field of environmental psychology is one of 
the main areas of study for understanding the relationship 
between wellbeing and natural environments.
In environmental psychology, theories and studies on 
values are largely based on the work of Rokeach (1973) and 
Schwartz (1992). A value is defined as “a desirable trans-
situational goal varying in importance, which serves as 
a guiding principle in the life of a person or other social 
entity” (Schwartz 1992, p. 21). Values in this meaning are 
also referred to as ‘held’ values, since they are seen as cog-
nitive elements that are deeply held, and are considered 
relatively stable throughout adult life. They are seen as 
foundational for other forms of cognition such as attitudes, 
norms and behavioral intentions (Fulton et al., 1996) and are 
considered important to study since they play a significant 
role in explaining specific beliefs and behavior (Stern 2000).
Whereas ethicists debate the meaning of categories of 
value such as instrumental and intrinsic, environmental psy-
chology has drawn upon these categories to conceptualize 
different value orientations that people have. Three value 
orientations (clusters of values) have been posited as relevant 
to environmentalism, namely the egoistic, social-altruistic, 
and biospheric (Stern et al. 1993).3 Biospheric values are 
conceptualized based on writings around the philosophical 
idea of ‘deep ecology’ from Devall (1988) and Næss (1989), 
which includes ascribing intrinsic value to living entities 
and ecosystems. The idea is that the different value orienta-
tions can influence attitudes of environmental concern which 
then can influence different pro-environmental behaviours 
(Stern and Dietz 1994). Even though psychological values 
are explained as associated with ethics, normative beliefs, 
and guiding principles, these values categories are psycho-
logical conceptualizations where values are viewed as cogni-
tive representations and are not axiological or philosophical 
value categories.
The value concept in psychology has explicitly been 
connected to valuation of ES (Raymond and Kenter 2016). 
Here, psychological values are referred to as transcenden-
tal values. Within the field of socio-cultural valuation, an 
important recent distinction is made between transcenden-
tal, contextual values and value indicators. Transcendental 
values concern “guiding principles that transcend specific 
situations”, which are based on the psychological concept of 
values, whereas contextual values are “opinions about worth 
or importance, which are dependent on an object of value” 
(Kenter et al. 2015, p. 89). As Kenter et al. (2015) point out, 
(1) stimulation theories, which focus on the physical environment as a source of sensory 
information; (2) control theories that emphasize the importance of an individual’s real, 
perceived, or desired control over stimulation; (3) ecological psychology which takes a 
dynamic-system approach to person-environment relations; (4) integral approaches such as 
organismic theory that strive to comprehensively describe the complex interrelationship of 
persons and settings; (5) operant approaches, which employ behavior modification 
techniques; (6) environment-centered theories, e.g. ecopsychology, which emphasize the 
environment’s own welfare; and (7) theories that include elements such as goals, norms, 
intentions, values, and attitudes (Gifford 2014).
Box 1  Major theoretical approaches in environmental psychology
3 Egoistic values represent self-interest; social-altruism represents 
altruism towards other humans; and biospheric values represent altru-
ism towards other species and the biosphere.
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the distinction between transcendental and contextual val-
ues bears resemblance to the distinction between ‘held’ and 
‘assigned’ values described above, but transcendental and 
contextual values are considered more refined with regards 
to conceptualizing specifically how the worth of an object 
is deemed a contextual value. Various other theories and 
instruments have been employed to connect environmental 
psychology to the idea of ES such as: value orientations 
(Hicks et al. 2015), place identity and naturalness (Knez 
et al. 2018), wellbeing indexes (Bryce et al. 2016), and in 
relation to monetary valuation (Raymond and Kenter 2016; 
Kenter et al. 2016). However, not all of these approaches 
employ the term ‘value’.
Relational value and environmental psychology
How relationality at large could be interpreted in the field of 
environmental psychology is beyond the scope of this paper, 
and we are here concerned with how RV can be interpreted 
and compared with existing value concepts. It is uncertain 
how RV correlates with psychological values, since these 
can be described as ‘held values’, i.e., cognitive and deeply 
held elements. Chan et al. (2018) clarify that they see RVs as 
different from held values, since held values are abstract and 
RVs are considered to be grounded in particular contexts. 
The concept of values in psychology, as well as e.g., tran-
scendental values, is then supposedly not compatible with 
RVs at all. On the other hand, RV has been described as 
related to held values since moral duties can determine how 
individuals relate with nature (Díaz et al. 2015).
Moreover, there is some confusion regarding how RV 
should be considered with regards to the characteristics of 
abstractness and context (Rawluk et al. 2019, this issue). 
Chan et al. (2018) describe RVs as context-dependent, and 
Rawluk et al. characterize RVs as not subject to generali-
zation. In contrast, Schulz and Martin-Ortega (2018) argue 
for the use of quantitative approaches to identify universal 
RVs shared across cultures, and state that theoretical con-
structs in environmental psychology such as worldviews, 
values, and beliefs could be understood as elements of 
relational values. Such application thus ignores context 
dependence and employs held values as elements of RVs. 
Klain et al. (2017) follow this approach to employ the idea 
of RV to see how it compares to a method to measure 
beliefs about nature; the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) 
scale. Beliefs are considered closely related to values, but 
whereas values are seen as more foundational and stable 
guiding principles, beliefs constitute the inner core of a 
person’s worldview and ‘basic truths’ about the physical 
and social reality (Dunlap et al., 2000). Klain et al. (2017) 
complement the NEP scale by adding ‘relational value 
statements’ and found these responses as distinct from 
NEP statements, interpreted as having potential as forming 
a new index. They point out that what RV is describing is 
not new conceptual territory in environmental psychology 
and instead refer to it as a ‘framing’. RV, or a relational 
framing, is here considered to help solve a methodologi-
cal problem of how to better understand the relationship 
between how different value framings ultimately influ-
ences behavior by adding more variables (Klain et  al. 
2017, Fig.  4). This operationalization of RV does not 
imply an engagement with qualitative or constructivist 
methodology, or a deeper engagement with ‘meanings’ as 
suggested in the socio-cultural valuation section above.
Application of RV in environmental psychology also 
raises questions regarding how the level of engagement 
with the ontological underpinnings of RV (i.e. Muraca 
2011) should be interpreted by different fields. Operation-
alizing RV as an additional variable does not necessarily 
account for the ontological ideas of relationality that pro-
ponents argue is important depending on how that relation-
ality is interpreted. If RV is to be interpreted as operation-
alized based on the metaphysical meaning of the term, i.e. 
according to a non-dualist ‘radical relationality’ (Muraca 
2016), then an engagement with the underlying ontological 
perspective of environmental psychological approaches is 
required, such as the difference between interactional and 
transactional worldviews (Altman and Rogoff 1991). The 
theories related to value outlined above in environmental 
psychology builds on an interactionist perspective, which 
sees sharp distinctions between the outside ‘objective’ 
world and the inside ‘subjective’ world (see Fodor 1997). 
More relational, or non-dichotomous perspectives can be 
interpreted as those building on a transactional worldview 
where the dynamic unity and mutually defining aspects 
between people and setting is emphasized (Werner and 
Altman 2000).How relational value should be interpreted 
with regards to underlying epistemological (and ontologi-
cal) perspectives is thus important to consider and would 
imply different outcomes for its operationalization.
Moreover, there are various approaches in environmen-
tal psychology that could be interpreted as describing or 
studying the content of RV in some aspects, but that do 
not employ psychological values concepts. For example 
the Nature Connectedness scale (Mayer and Frantz 2004) 
measures individual’s feeling of community with nature, 
and the inclusion of Nature in Self scale (Martin and Czel-
lar 2016) assesses individual environmental identity. The 
concept of place-attachment (Altman and Low 1992), i.e. 
the emotional bond between person and place, is also a 
way of interpreting how RV could be conceptualized with 
its strong focus on contexts and experiences for under-
standing meanings of places.
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Discussion
We have investigated how the notion of RV fits within 
three fields through outlining their respective value taxon-
omies and conceptualizations. We have shown how value 
concepts within these fields are used to serve different 
aims and address different questions. Most obviously there 
is a tension between the fundamental normative questions 
(primarily targeted in environmental ethics), and descrip-
tive questions concerning how people value and behave 
with regards to nature (concerns of ecosystem services 
valuation and environmental psychology) Nonetheless, 
the idea of RV is a potentially fruitful way to broaden 
perspectives on values in general and may prove to its 
worth as an epistemological framing in ES valuation, but 
as a value category it is not entirely convincing. We see a 
few potential risks associated with the use of the concept, 
but also its potential as a boundary object and we expand 
on this below.
First, we want to call attention to how our investigation 
sheds light on an inherent contradiction in the ES valua-
tion discourse. RV is intended to better describe how people 
actually think and behave and this is fused with the question 
of why we should protect nature. Maier and Feest (2016) 
point out how the authors of the IPBES framework (i.e. Díaz 
et al. 2015) conflate the two separate questions of describing 
and assessing how people value nature versus normative and 
prescriptive questions of values of nature. As we have shown 
above with the contrast between ES valuation and environ-
mental ethics, these two questions requires very different 
kinds of investigation. That is, describing how people value 
nature, regardless of how accurate the methods are, does not 
necessarily provide us with answers to the underlying moral 
concerns. Another justification of RV is that it is seen as a 
better representation of people’s worldviews and motiva-
tions. This idea seems to align with the perspective that phi-
losophers have been asking the wrong questions with regards 
to what motivates people to act for biodiversity conserva-
tion (c.f. Odenbaugh 2016). While the concern of motivat-
ing people is highly warranted, our overview demonstrates 
that the aim of ethics is not to accurately describe either 
how people value nature or how they are best motivated. A 
closer reading of disciplinary perspectives and engagement 
with theoretical underpinnings can prevent such confusion 
from the outset. That is not to say that disciplinary ques-
tions of values should be kept separate, or that disciplinary 
boundaries should not be challenged. RV can have signifi-
cant potential in the quest to integrate perspectives on the 
why, what and how of values of nature that can underpin 
sustainability transitions.
We also want to stress that conflation of descriptive and 
normative values here implies a risk of overriding moral 
considerations of nature if these become subject to be 
reconceptualization as descriptive values with the appli-
cation of RV. With RV being developed as a strategy to 
inform IPBES assessments (Chan et al. 2018), diverse per-
spectives from across the social sciences and humanities 
are increasingly re-positioned and conceptualized accord-
ing to those theoretical premises (Pascual et al. 2018). 
This includes adapting to how the NCP as a conceptual 
framework, just like ES, is one-directional and not able 
to reflect intrinsic value, if intrinsic value is conceived 
of as independent of humans (Kenter 2018). For exam-
ple, the act of caring for nature, or an ethics of care (Jax 
et al. 2019), here becomes interpreted as either intrinsic 
value being something unrelated to human-nature values 
relationships, or as a matter of ‘contribution’ to wellbe-
ing. RV thereby deliberately manifests the separation of 
intrinsic value from the scope of NCP or ES, and as Pic-
colo (2017) points out, posits people’s subjective relations 
as the locus of interest, and as separate from nature.
RV has often been presented as a third category next to 
intrinsic and instrumental value, but the concept does not 
seem to contribute to solving problems within environ-
mental ethics. Instead, RV as a values concept, as it has 
been described in the recent literature, is aimed at solv-
ing problems that arise as a consequence of the theoretical 
foundations of ES and ES valuation. The problem seems 
to lie in how the axiological categories of intrinsic versus 
instrumental value are defined and operationalized within 
the ES paradigm. As demonstrated above, ES valuation and 
RV conceptualization formulate intrinsic value in terms of 
objective value, and instrumental value is described as based 
on preference satisfaction. RV is an effort to overcome the 
dichotomy of values in values assessments where intrinsic 
value is represented by conservationists and instrumental 
value associated with economics, through including ‘non-
instrumental anthropocentric’ values seen as represented by 
perspectives from the social sciences and humanities.
RV is thus more than a values concept, since it also is 
used as a rationale for broadening the otherwise mostly posi-
tivist or post-positivist epistemological perspective within 
ES valuation and ES-related approaches, to include more 
of the qualitative social sciences, humanities and in general 
more constructivist epistemologies and relativist research 
traditions. The “novel” focus on relations and meaning 
through qualitative and interpretivist methodology is old 
territory to many fields that traditionally have fallen outside 
of ES valuation. RV, however, is developed as an expan-
sion of the ES concept, which is rooted in realist traditions 
and this history seems to be part of the reason behind the 
apparent theoretical identity crisis and lack of philosophical 
perspective that the RV concept is suffering from. Kenter 
et al. (2019) describe how social values and relational val-
ues have both evolved from a recognition of the limitations 
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of mainstream economic valuation within ES assessments 
which opened up a field initially associated with cultural 
ES that has relied on wide ranging methods but with little 
clarification of underpinning theoretical perspectives. The 
aim of the RV concept thus can better be described as an 
attempt at establishing a new field with its own methodologi-
cal and epistemological basis rather than adding a theoretical 
value concept. Our point here is that RV has to do with a 
shift towards or explicit engagement with more qualitative 
methodologies, and that it can be questioned if studies that 
are now applying the concept can be seen as employing a 
more constructivist perspective or qualitative methodology, 
which includes a more comprehensive idea of culture than 
ES, rather than a new type of value.
The idea of seeing RV as a ‘boundary object’ (Star and 
Griesemer 1989) that could be used to integrate specific 
epistemological perspectives on value is perhaps help-
ful here. Boundary objects are flexible enough to adapt to 
the needs of separate and different epistemic communities 
whilst being sufficiently rigid to allow for effective com-
munication. When applied to concepts such as RV, however, 
questions arise as to what it is about this concept, beyond 
the appeal that the label itself might have, that can ensure 
communication.4 The mere sharing of a term is presumably 
not sufficient to adequately integrate perspectives from the 
qualitative social sciences and humanities into ES valua-
tion. Fundamental ontological and epistemological incon-
sistencies can be expected between how these disciplines 
conceive of nature and culture versus how these have been 
conceptualized in ES valuation (c.f. Stålhammar and Ped-
ersen 2017; Kirchhoff 2019). RV has nonetheless (already) 
contributed to an expansion of disciplinary perspectives in 
ES valuation, and now provides an opportunity for further 
cross-fertilization of perspectives.
Moreover, our examples of different interpretations of RV 
in environmental psychology shows how it is important to 
consider the level of how the concept can be operational-
ized on a spectrum from ontological meanings of the term 
to epistemological and methodological. This relies on the 
question of whether this concept calls for a re-evaluation 
of the very premises of how to think about human-nature 
relationships, crucially including a call to go beyond ‘Car-
tesian dualisms’ to shift the focus from subject-object as 
the locus of interest to that of relationships (e.g., Muraca 
2011). However, perspectives that align with e.g., a ‘non-
dualist’ monist mind-world perspective (Jackson 2010) do 
not necessarily align with some of the accounts of RV that 
we have described here, such as Klain et al. (2017), which 
raises questions of the operationalization of ontological 
interpretations of RV. Nonetheless, efforts to operational-
izing and apply RV should make explicit what aspect of the 
concept, on what theoretical ‘level’, as well as what disci-
pline/field is drawn upon. This special issue provides useful 
distinctions and overviews (see Rawluk et al. 2019 this issue 
and Kenter et al. 2019).
Even though our analysis points to a lack of utility of RV 
as a values category, we welcome RV as an interdisciplinary 
object or epistemological framing. The concepts importance 
for the sustainability agenda can be considerable in the long 
term, despite that it might not force different disciplines 
together under perfect conditions.
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